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A number of recent histories of Britain’s late-19th century telegraph network have taken inspira-
tion from many sources, not least historians’ concern to test and delineate the contemporary and
modern world of transnational policymaking, the return of maritime history to the forefront of
historical studies, and the desire to understand the late 19th century empire that seemed to be
drawing strength from technological progress. But another key reason for this new interest in the
electric telegraph is clearly the communications revolution of the last 20 years, and the internet’s
development as the main means of dealing with information in the modern world. This article
demonstrates just how important this present-mindedness has been, but it also shows just how
unlike the internet was the Victorian telegraph system, for it was expensive, patchy and often
unreliable, encouraging letter-writing and ship-borne commerce just as much as electronic com-
munication. The telegraph’s inauguration reinforced local and imperial nationalisms and rivalries,
and arms races, whatever the liberal hopes invested in it; its arrival often led to the concentration
of press ownership and a sense of intra-imperial, rather than global or trans-continental, links. The
example of the telegraph, it is contended, should form a cautionary example of how problematical
it is to take present-day developments and apply them – even as organising concepts – to the past.
The Transatlantic Cable ‘Revolutions’ of 1858 and 1866
On 5.15am on Thursday 5 August 1858, a shore detail from the 4582 ton USS Niagara –
the largest steam frigate in the world – dragged a huge and heavy cable ashore at Trinity
Bay, Newfoundland, and connected it to a covered cable on the land. By the end of the
same day, HMS Agamemnon dropped another cable in Ireland, while her crew fired guns
to wake Knightstown’s sleepy villagers. At 2.45 am, the next morning, 6 August, the first
human signal ever to pass electrically between continents was exchanged through those
cables and between the two sides of the ocean.1 The mood at the time can be captured
by the first substantial message that was sent between the directors of the Atlantic Tele-
graph Company in Britain to their counterparts in the USA: ‘Europe and America are
united by telegraphic communication. ‘‘Glory to God in the highest, on Earth peace,
goodwill towards men’’’.2
Niagara and Agamemnon’s success was a relief for its promoters, to say the least. As the
London Times reflected at the time at Valentia Bay: ‘never, probably, was the sight of
land more welcome, as it brought to a successful conclusion one of the greatest, but at
the same time most difficult, schemes which was ever undertaken’. The Atlantic Tele-
graph Company, formed in 1856, had already failed twice to bridge the Atlantic, once
the previous year and then again in June 1858. That last attempt had seen Agamemnon, in
particular, brave gales and huge waves in her efforts to get the job done. For a week
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between 14 and 21 June, the men lay in their hammocks unable to sleep, as planks of the
upper deck began to work loose; twice the ship nearly went over before her captain,
George Preedy, could bring her about and run before the storm. Nicholas Wood, the
Times of London’s correspondent on board, described the scene on the second day of the
storm: ‘three or four gigantic waves were seen approaching the ship… rolling on like hills
of green water, with a crown of foam that seemed to double their height… there was a
fearful crashing as she [the ship] lay over… for everything broke adrift’. The ship was
lucky to survive, let alone finish her cable-laying duties.3
Unfortunately for the Atlantic Telegraph Company, the transatlantic link broke down
very quickly. It proved unreliable from the start, and many messages had to be repeated.
During August, the cable became less and less reliable. By September, only a few words at a
time could be carried; on 20 October, the line finally went dead. All attempts to revive it
ended in failure – a disaster that, for a time, helped to bring the entire idea into disrepute.
£300,000 had been sunk, with virtually no results, into the Atlantic. A Red Sea cable to
India had also failed, at an even greater cost of £800,000. A total of 11,364 miles of
telegraph cable had been laid across the globe, but only 3000 miles were operating.4
By the time Isambard Kingdom Brunel’s enormous steamer the SS Great Eastern set out
from Ireland on the same mission, on 13 July 1866, there had been yet another failure in
1865; the cable had snapped after becoming entangled in the laying-out machinery.5 This
time, the great ship sailed a little earlier in the year and at a point in the calendar when the
sea was likely to be calmer. The decision was entirely justified by the flat calm that greeted
most of its voyage that year. Only once did the cable become enmeshed in the machinery,
and this time it luckily became tangled in other loops of the line rather than any sharp edges.
Apart from this mishap, the ship reached Trinity Bay in Canada without much event on
Friday, 27 July.6 The idea’s key American promoter, Cyrus Field, immediately sent the
news by packet boat to New York. His message, which arrived in that city on 29 July, was
an apt one for two decades of maritime engineering effort: ‘I cannot find words suitable to
convey my admiration for the men who have so ably conducted the nautical, engineering,
and electrical departments of this enterprise, amidst difficulties’.7
All this was indeed an enormous achievement. But it was a success that had wider
implications than any mere feat of ingenuity and endurance, however impressive. What
these sailors and technicians had achieved would come to be seen as an Imperial and glo-
bal communications revolution that historians have increasingly come to understand as a
parallel and counterpoint to the internet revolution of the last 20 years. The ‘new’ impe-
rial histories of the 1990s and 2000s have traced out many other themes: the nature of
imperial knowledge production, including novel geographical and statistical imaginings;
different methods of knowledge transfer, including the influence of cadres of experts and
promoters; and the question of how the Victorians debated whether their Empire could
ever become a coherent force in domestic or world affairs. But the cable network that
Niagara and Agamemnon had helped to inaugurate created and constantly re-created all
of those fresh bonds. The re-discovery of this ‘Victorian internet’ has therefore become
a central and even unifying strand among these concerns – and one fostered by the
‘networked society’ that is the subject of so many hopes, claims and fears today.
The ‘Annihilation of Space’: Contemporary Thought and Modern Historiography
Many observers believed, even at the time, that the cable network had changed the world
for good. The second Charles Bright, son of the Atlantic Telegraph’s engineer Charles
Tilston Bright who laboured for so long to build the original cables, might be taken as a
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representative enthusiast. He thought the completion of the Pacific cable to Australia in
1902 meant that ‘at one stroke’ that ‘country was brought, telegraphically speaking,
10,000 miles nearer to the Dominion of Canada than before’. These cables, thought
Bright, were ‘practically annihilating space’.8 ‘The world’s system of electrical nerves’, he
called them.9 He was hardly alone in such thoughts. ‘There are no longer any far off
lands’, The Telegraph declared in the 1860s: ‘time itself is telegraphed out of existence’.
The Times imagined that ‘moderation and peace’ would be the inevitable consequence of
the cross-Channel cable completed in 1851.10
The worldwide progress of the cable system, which reached for instance Alexandria in
1861, Suez in 1863, Bombay in 1865, Australia in 1871 and then New Zealand in 1876,
lifted the hopes of many progressive social theorists and humanitarians. Liberal political
and legal thinkers such as the Frenchman Charles Verge´ argued that the telegraph and the
railway line would lead human societies inevitably to progress towards an integrated and
peaceful international community.11 At a more popular level, the New York Evening Post
thought that Field’s first cable attempt might ‘make the great heart of humanity beat with
a single pulse’. A placard in the New York parade celebrating the 1858 achievement
reported ‘married’ ‘In the Church of Progress, ⁄ At the altar of Commerce, ⁄ The Old to
the New World. ⁄ May they never be divorced!’12 Two journalists captured the mood of
the first apparent success in 1858:
Of all the marvellous achievements of modern science, the Electric Telegraph is transcendently
the greatest and most serviceable to mankind. It is a perpetual miracle, which no familiarity can
render commonplace… To say that this achievement marks an era in social life is not to give it
the proper characterization. It marks an era in the unfolding of the human mind. The Tele-
graph has more than a mechanical meaning; it has an ideal, a religious, and a prospective signifi-
cance, far-reaching and incalculable in its influences.13
Liberals’ hopes were by no means all misplaced. The telegraph stimulated thinking about
how oceanic space should be governed, leading to the creation of the world’s first multi-
national body – the International Telegraph Union of 1865, itself taken as a model by
the Universal Postal Union of 1874.14 The management of the cables themselves were
covered by the ‘International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables’, signed
by forty nations in 1884.15
It is little wonder, then, that historians have been reassessing the importance of this
‘new era in the unfolding mind’. A number of new histories have issued from both
academic and most popular presses. Gillian Cookson’s 2003 book The Wire that Changed
the World told the story of the Atlantic Telegraph Company’s exploits; Chester Hearn’s
Circuits in the Sea, published in 2004, lionised the engineers and financiers involved;
economic historians such as Erik Baark have delineated how the cable system might have
allowed developing nations such as China to leap forwards into the ‘second industrial
revolution’ of the late 19th century.16 Historians of science have imagined Britain’s
dominance of the new cable technology as the exogenous variable required to explain the
country’s hegemony in ‘peace keeping’ and ‘law and order’; recent treatments of the
life of Lord Kelvin, who served on the 1865 and 1866 attempts to lay the transatlan-
tic cable, have placed more weight than hitherto on his engineering work.17
There are many other reasons for this renewal of interest. Historians’ recent concern
with transnational learning is highlighted yet again by the depth and breadth of the
network’s international governance.18 The recrudescence of maritime history, as much
concerned with the effect of the ocean on land as on the ships that carried the cables,
has been another factor.19 But the cable system was full of ideological ramifications for
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the Empire, too – the main thrust of serious historical writing on this subject. After at
least one scholarly generation has endlessly unpackaged the ‘decline’, ‘destruction’ or ‘fall’
of the British Empire, new emergent literatures have been focusing on a period and a
rhetoric that saw the Empire as new: as a dynamic, purposeful, regenerative set of possible
futures, which might save the home islands from a spiral of economic, political and
spiritual decline.20 The work of the Cambridge academic Duncan Bell and his 2007 book
The Idea of Greater Britain have been foremost in this re-assessment. The Idea of Greater
Britain persuasively shows how by the 1890s, the struggle over Imperial federation was
enacted against a background of perpetually alternating confidence and pessimism
regarding the future of both nation and Empire. He has termed this ‘a constantly
mutating blend of optimism and anxiety’ that filled the political sphere with recipes for
Imperial and thus national renewal.21
The telegraph played a key role in this debate, for it altered how Britons perceived the
vast distances that separated them from colonies and Dominions. As Bell puts it, ‘the his-
tory of globalisation is as much a history of the perception that the world is ‘‘shrinking’’
as it is a history of increasing economic interdependence’. The global imperial dreams
of the late 19th century can at least partly be explained by reference to the worldwide
communications network that was then emerging. British information, news, ‘facts’ and
perceptions, rather than her armies and navies, might now encircle the globe. As Bell has
further argued, therefore, ‘technological change was not important simply because it
helped to meet imperial ‘‘goals’’, but because it reshaped the very identity and direction
of the goals themselves’.22 Maps of the empire clearly marked the ‘all-red routes’ in just
that colour. They were clearly being imagined as owned by Britain, and as both linking
together and sealing off her scattered territories.23 The telegraph allowed, for instance,
the imposition of British time discipline throughout the world in the form of Greenwich
Mean Time, promoted as it was by George Biddell Airy as Astronomer Royal in the
1850s.24
These ‘British’ identities did not all emerge at the metropole before passing ‘outwards’
to Imperial outposts. Alan Lester has recently noted that the areas switched ‘on’ by the
arrival of the cable system became major metropolitan hubs in their own right, blotting
out the non-Imperial areas without cables that were consequently switched ‘off’. The rel-
atively noisy message-writing of the cities and townships in those dominions and colonies
with a cable station tended to silence those without.25 This new literature owes much, if
often implicitly, to post-modern and post-structuralist ways of thinking: Bell is explicit
about his debt to the radical geographer David Harvey, who has analysed new theories of
time and space as integral to the creation of modernism itself; Lester, drawing more
implicitly on post-colonial literary theory, argues that his focus is similarly on ‘a more
differentiated and spatialised conception of British colonial discourses’.26
The new emphasis on such ‘discourses’ has permitted historians to analyse colonial rec-
iprocity and the freely-floating ‘Britishness’ that emerged at the empire’s limits, relying
not just on electric signals but reinforced by personal letters, increased trade and local and
regional news outlets.27 Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich have highlighted the growth
and vitality of such imperial cities as Melbourne, Auckland and Toronto that were now
linked directly to one another for the first time.28 These were now linked not just to
London but also directly to one another and to their own rural hinterlands; the great
majority of traffic on the trans-Tasman line that linked Australia and New Zealand from
1876 passed between and within those two societies.29 Those fast-growing new cities
forged new identifies in an entirely different manner to those of Britain’s African and
Indian possessions, inevitable perhaps given their quite distinct racial characteristics,
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history and geography; they were hardly on ‘one great plane’. But their dynamism, and
their connections to ‘Britishness’ and to each other on the eve of the First World War,
were unimaginable without the electric telegraph spanning the oceans.
The ideology of a ‘new’ or even ‘third’ British Empire, so obvious in the late 19th
century as the world seemed to shrink, is therefore at the heart of the recent histories of
the telegraph network. But another key reason for the recent flurry of works in this area
is connected with that sense of speed, namely the fact that the ‘annihilation of space’
resonates deeply at the start of the 21st century, a period when ‘the annihilation of space’
was once again a familiar topic of public discourse. In the hands of writers without the
deep reserves of research and knowledge of context mobilised by authors such as Bell and
Lester, this fascination with rapidity can seem disconcertingly crude. The journalist Tim
Standage, in his lively and populist 1998 book The Victorian Internet, only made plain a
comparison that is implicitly (and perhaps more sensitively) explored in more academic
work:
Although it has now faded from view, the telegraph lives on within the communication tech-
nologies that have substantially built upon its foundations: the telephone, the fax machine, and
more recently, the Internet. And it is the Internet – despite being regarded as a quintessentially
modern means of communication – that has the most in common with its telegraphic predeces-
sor. Like the telegraph network, the Internet allows people to communicate across greater dis-
tances using interconnected networks. Common rules and protocols enable any sort of
computer to exchange message with any other – just as messages could easily be passed from
one kind of telegraphic apparatus to another. The journey of an e-mail message, as it hops from
mail server to mail server, towards its destination, mirrors the passage of a telegram from one
telegraph office to another.30
Many authors, in a number of allied but sometimes ahistorical fields, have drawn on this
‘first internet’ to recommend lessons or policies for the World Wide Web. The parallel is
sometimes taken for granted. Textual critics such as Elleke Boehmer have been explicit
in analysing these new links as involving, ‘like the Web today’, ‘intensely modern disinte-
grations’ of time and place.31 The criminologist Michael McGuire has argued that tele-
graph fraud and the misuse of financial information in the mid-19th century showed just
how far ‘the basic principles of telepresence were already in place’. ‘More pervasive com-
pressed social relations’ were the result, with the telegraph delivering on its ‘capacity to
‘‘accelerate’’ time’.32 In Digital Ego, cyberspace expert Jacob Van Kokswijk’s 2007 explo-
ration of ‘online’ identity, Van Kokswijk has contended that the female telegraphers who
took down and transmitted 19th century cable messages were akin to the ‘webmasters’ of
today. ‘Chat rooms and the online social life’, he argues, ‘arose in the 1860s’, among
bored telegraphers who ‘chatted with each other, swapping stories, jokes, news, rumours,
and played chess’.33 Geographers’ ‘atlases of the Internet’ contain maps of the worldwide
telegraph as early chapters in a deterministic progress; some cultural studies academics
tracking financial globalization find that ‘it is not difficult to make a comparison between
that web and the contemporary construction of global telecommunications networks by
carrier operators’.34
Each of these disciplines and studies might benefit from a deeper familiarity with the
new historiography of the British Empire and the telegraph that has been taking hold in
the last 20 years – at a time when the Internet has infiltrated many elements of day-
to-day life, in the developed world at least. For it is the ragged, multilinear, uncertain
and unpredictable nature of change, rather than its smooth ‘acceleration’, which is most
notable in (very different) work of Bell, Lester, Bridge and Fedorowich. It is an emphasis
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increasingly familiar across the discipline – in, for instance, legal history, which
increasingly emphasises the chaotic, multilinear but still symbolic nature of power in the
developing international system and the constantly-emergent corpus of international
law.35 The present-mindedness of other and less historically minded authors objectifies
and utilises the past rather than exploring and delineating its contingent nature. Historians
themselves cannot but be affected by the fact that they are living through another
communications revolution carried through to the sound of very similar claims, but this
essay will argue that the parallels with, and thus the ‘lessons’ from, this imagined past can
be deeply misleading.
The Unwired World and the Uses of History
Many of the more hopeful and confident claims for the telegraph that were made at the
time had eventually to be qualified. The telegraph was not an instantaneous means
of communication. Its similarity to the latter-day Internet is more notable for the
technophilia and sometimes uncritical admiration which it garnered than for any objective
comparison between the two technologies.36 They tell us more about the manner in
which we see the past than how the cable system was actually imagined and used in the
19th century. As Iwan Rhys Moruis has pointed out, the comparison is ‘deeply anachro-
nistic. Victorian understandings of the telegraph were formed and informed by the tangle
of assumptions and aspirations that made up their own daily culture’.37 It is as important
to be clear about how the telegraph system differed from our own world as we can be
about the parallels between the two periods.
Telegrams sent through long submarine cables did arrive very quickly, but they might
take some hours because the surrounding water absorbed electricity and blurred the sig-
nal. In any case, telegraphers at the other end of the wire had to operate at an average
speed of no more than 30 words per minute as they listened to the often-faint impulses
coming down the cable. It was a problem that was not solved until the 1920s and the
laying of ‘loaded’ cables, which sustained a much sharper signal.38 Recurrent failures on
the line to South Africa, for instance, led to gaps appearing in cable messages. The first
unbroken telegraph connection to India that opened in January 1865 took days, rather
than hours, to carry messages to the subcontinent, and they frequently arrived in a gar-
bled and unusable state.39 They then had to be handled and rehandled by the ubiquitous
‘messenger boys’ who became a familiar trope of both late 19th-century fiction and
attempts to understand and appeal to ‘the people’. It was and is a class that Gregory
Downey has well evoked in an American context, and whose lives are obliterated in any
simple-minded treatment of the ‘first internet’.40 Given these links in the chain, and their
attendant uncertainty, it was understandable – despite subsequent advances in the machin-
ery used – that in 1893, the Colonial Office handled an average of six telegrams per
office day, while it dealt with 138 letters and dispatches.41
The relative expense and difficulty of using the cable system meant that information
certainly did not become universally available, or even accessible on a more liberal basis.
High costs caused a concentration of colonial press ownership that became increasingly
difficult to reverse, as Simon Potter has made clear.42 The ownership of Australian news-
papers became more concentrated, and their sources more one-dimensional, due to the
cable. New Zealand’s single press association of 1878 had a monopoly of up-to-date news
information until well after the First World War. This did tie the country more closely
to Britain as the source of much of her news, but it also bound New Zealand itself more
closely together as citizens became recipients of the same news stories wherever they
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lived.43 The press agency Reuters was able to take advantage of its existing market
strength since, as the eastern cable had begun its slow progress towards the Antipodes,
Reuters had maintained agencies at each telegraph station along the line. The agency was
thus able to establish itself as the main purveyor of information on the mail ships that
then sailed towards Australia and New Zealand, carrying the latest news, from the end of
the line. Reuters’ dreams of completely dominating the Australian market were only
thwarted by the concerted action of the Sydney Morning Herald’s rival papers.44
Nor did the cables eliminate the importance of letters carried by ship – a form of com-
munication that has, quite rightly, been attracting nearly as much attention as the cable
network in recent years. The work of Sarah Pearsall, Konstantin Dierks, Erika Rappaport
and Elizabeth Buettner has shown just how important letter-writing was in the emotional
support of Imperial families and the idea of ‘British space’ across colonial North America
and India both before and after the cable revolution.45 The faster steam ships of the late
19th century even offered much quicker shipborne transit for both letters and print
journalism than had hitherto been possible, and might be a good deal more reliable than
cables. The Peninsular Steam Navigation Company that gradually evolved into the
conglomerate P&O, the ‘Pacific and Orient’ is the best example of this world-girdling
network. Its first two lines to Alexandria in 1840, and its first link to India at Calcutta
via Suez and then its initial Singapore-Sydney mail route established in 1852–53, opened
a new and more reliable age of direct mail services.46 Macgregor Laird’s African
Steamship Company, operating out of Liverpool from 1852, was another good example,
running 1000 ton steamers to Lagos every week. Laird soon made the service even more
regular, and the ships covered 4157 miles in 23 days, even allowing for stops on the way.
The regularity and reliability of the service helps explain why there was no West African
cable until 1886.47 A monthly steamship ran on the route between Cape Town and
Plymouth from 1851, cutting the journey time on that route to 43 days. Lester has
shown, in his pathbreaking book on Imperial Networks and the formation of colonial
identities in southern Africa, just how important the low cost of steam communication
really was: for it ‘allowed the Cape reading market to be flooded with more up-to-date
metropolitan newspapers, magazines and books’.48 It was not just the telegraph that was
shrinking the world.
Letters carried by ship cost a great deal less than cables, partly because they were so
heavily subsidised by the state. The British government was spending no less than £1m
a year annually on mail contracts by 1860.49 The West African cable of 1886 cost
eight shillings and ten pence per word for transmitting messages to Lagos: Macgregor
Laird’s steamships were much cheaper.50 The original transatlantic cable of 1858 charged
$100 or £22 for a minimum of 20 words.51 It was only when tariffs on cable communi-
cation were lowered, as they were for instance to India in 1885 and Australia in 1890,
that the number of messages sent really began to take off; Indian traffic increased tenfold
in 20 years, while Australian demand increased from about 800,000 to around 2.3 million
words between 1890 and 1897.52 The number of physical letters carried on board ships
grew, rather than falling under competitive challenge by the telegraph; this phenomenon
was especially marked after the first postcards were introduced in Austria in 1869, and
Germany and Britain in 1870.53
The cable network remained similarly ‘grounded’ in pre-existing technological and
political reality on land as well as at sea. For many decades, the telegraph was linked to
the railways on which the cables were fixed. Much more was spent on railways inside
Britain itself than on submarine cables, and it had been the Great Western Railway’s use
of the technique on their line from Paddington to Slough that had first shown how
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useful the technology could be.54 The initial cables between Australia’s major cities were
carried by railways, aspiring as they did to spread the latest news that had arrived in any
one port.55 The cable network could, for many decades, get no message through to the
borders of the Empire without a long train journey involved at the end of the line.
As for reducing ‘conflict and misunderstandings’, by the early 21st century, these electric
lines resembled the tentacles of an imperial octopus; they were increasingly managed, pro-
tected and defended as strategic assets. In common with international law and transnational
economic links more generally, its influence was more difficult and halting than many
contemporaries, and many present commentators, have supposed. Governments in London
remained unworried for many years as to the security of their long-distance cables. The
lack of an oceanic naval challenge and the losses that the Treasury had made backing the
trans-Atlantic schemes of the 1850s and 1860s combined to explain this lack of interest. As
late as 1893, the Postmaster-General circulated an Admiralty memorandum casting doubt
on any Pacific cable scheme in order to head off Canadian pressure for just such an inno-
vation.56 But increasingly, cables were seen as national and not international property; as
state property and strategic assets to be prized and protected, rather than shared. The
nationalisation of Britain’s domestic telegraph companies under the Post Office in
1869 was in this sense a harbinger of the future.57 The expansion of the Indian land tele-
graph network under Governor-General Dalhousie in the 1850s had helped defeat the
Great Rebellion or ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857. When the Chinese government resisted the
penetration of western telegraphs in the late 1860s, the Great Northern Telegraph Com-
pany was encouraged simply to ignore their objections. In 1870–1871, the Great North-
ern’s cable ship connected Shanghai to Hong Kong via a submarine cable that blatantly
ignored Chinese sovereignty. When the China Submarine Company’s cable ship con-
nected Hong Kong to Europe in 1871, this southern route was complete.58
Contemporaries thought that the cable was opening up frictionless and open communi-
cations, a universalism to which many political radicals had looked forwards since
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.59 But the new technology was effecting
changes that were often quite the opposite of liberals’ hopes, and which remained very
different from the multi-lateral internet of today. Britain was now at the heart of a
world-wide web of communications that often had to pass through London, the city at
its heart. As the French writer Maxime de Margerie argued in 1909, ‘if, despite the pro-
digious development of Antwerp and Hamburg, London remains the great world market-
place, it is because news from overseas arrives there first’.60 In 1913, Britain owned
281,828 km of sea cable; the USA only 100,831; the French 43,680; and Germany
43,294. Britain owned more of the telecommunications infrastructure than the other
great powers put together.61 Gradually, British officials became convinced that cables
could not be ‘neutralised’ during any major armed conflict, partly because they believed
that France and Russia would never sign such an agreement.62
‘Security’ eventually became as all-pervasive a concern and goal as ‘peace’ and ‘com-
merce’ had been in the 1850s and 1860s. Cables were sent through friendly or neutral
powers, such as Denmark instead of Prussia – the work of the Great Northern Telegraph
Company forging a close relationship between the UK and Denmark from its 1869
inception.63 The second Charles Bright complained in an essay of 1903 that the existing
Pacific cable passed through the USA, and that its Atlantic counterpart was laid
‘dangerously near’ to St Pierre – a French possession off Newfoundland.64 An official
inter-department committee of 1902 remarked that ‘the greater the number of states
through which a land telegraph passes, the greater is the probability that one or more of
them, at some supreme and critical moment… may exercise its power of interrupting
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communication’.65 Safety from enemy action was a key reason Sir Sandford Fleming, the
Canadian Pacific railway’s engineer-in-chief, started to advocate a Pacific cable from Brit-
ish Columbia to Australia in the 1880s. He used the Egyptian crisis of 1882 to put his
case to the imperial government in London. If the existing cable to the east that passed
through Suez could be so easily threatened, his argument ran, it would be better to have
another line that reached around the world in the other direction.66
These developments really speeded up when Joseph Chamberlain, immense enthusiast
for empire that he was, entered the Colonial Office in 1895. Chamberlain quickly
assembled a Pacific cable committee, containing representatives of all the colonies and
dominions involved; he took the issue to Cabinet, and won, in February 1899.67 The
Colonial Office also came round to the idea once it became clear that a French
Company, the Socie´te´ Franc¸aise des Te´le´graphes Sous-Marins, had secured a contract
from Queensland and New South Wales to lay a cable to the French colony of New
Caledonia. This raised the particularly unappealing prospect for Lord Ripon, the colonial
secretary, that the first trans-Pacific cable might be owned by the French.68 ‘The risk of
war incident to the present route’, Chamberlain told the Cabinet, ‘would be avoided by
a cable in the opposite direction. It would be throughout at a comparatively remote
distance from any foreign naval stronghold; whereas all the present cables to Africa and
the East and Australasia pass close to the naval fortresses of Cherbourg, Brest and in the
Mediterranean to Bizerta’. And so the line was laid from Vancouver, first to Fanning
Island 3450 miles to the south-west, before passing on to Fiji, Norfolk Island and then in
two spurs to New Zealand and Queensland in Australia.69
Conclusions: Information Technology and its Limits
‘Of all our modern wonders the most wonderful’: Charles Dickens’ judgement on the
electric cable was hardly a singular one, as we have seen.70 The American pioneer Samuel
Morse thought that the cable might abolish war, for ‘the chances of conflict and misun-
derstanding must be diminished in an incalculable degree’.71 We have seen that the
worldwide cable network of the late 19th century may have been ‘wonderful’, but also
that it represented rather less of a break with the past than Morse supposed. This realisa-
tion should have contemporary consequences, for it is as important now as then to guard
against technological determinism as the main variable that explains social change. The
limits of the Victorian telegraph system should hardly surprise us in an Internet age whose
scholars talk increasingly about multifarious ‘digital divides’ rather than a single scale or
variant of ‘information poverty’.72 Tracing out the social, cultural, geographical, age- and
gendered-related limits to universal online access becomes a more ubiquitous, and more
urgent, task by the day.73 A history which lacked a similar sense of differential access, of
the barriers to technology’s adoption and effects – in short, of the ‘weighty’ as well as the
‘weightless’ world – would be poverty-stricken indeed.74
Even so, something fundamental about perceptions of distance had changed, as histori-
ans of British Imperial ideologies such as Potter have shown. It is an obvious conclusion
if we stretch the time-period out a little, and look at the situation in the 1840s and in
1914. The Times had hitherto spent £10,000 a year maintaining a rapid ‘extraordinary
express’ service from India, with special agents, couriers, channel steamers and trains all
pressed into service. On the eve of the First World War that gap of many weeks had
closed to almost nothing.75 For the first time in human history, communications had
been separated from transportation over vast distances, a major cultural, economic and
social upheaval.76 The idea of ‘virtual space’, and of the different ‘modes’ of time
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experienced by individuals communicating in different ways, was opened up.77 Rudyard
Kipling’s famous poem, ‘The deep-sea cables’, captured this epochal change: for Kipling,
men ‘have killed their father time; ⁄ Joining hands in the gloom, a league from the last of
the sun. ⁄ Hush! Men talk to-day o’er the waste of the ultimate slime, ⁄ And a new Word
runs between: whispering, ‘‘Let us be one!’’’.78
National and colonial self-images, as well as warlike physical resources, were forged
and reforged by these changes. The governor of the Australian colony of Victoria called
the telegraph ‘a great Imperial binding force’ during the South African War of 1899-
1902. It took only a few hours for the Colonial Office’s pro-war telegrams to reach Aus-
tralia during this conflict, something which encouraged volunteering and general war fer-
vour across the continent. It took five to seven weeks for the opposite points to be put,
since the anti-war Manchester Guardian had to be shipped to Australia.79 Even in Canada,
where the US conglomerate Associated had cornered the market, a quarter of reports
during the South African War either directly or indirectly cited British newspapers or
War Office reports.80 During the late 19th century, the colonies became less ‘national’,
and more ‘British’, for just this reason. This was exactly what Fleming had intended in
his ceaseless campaigns for more cables, ‘bringing the several governmental units, not sep-
arated by great oceans, into one friendly neighbourhood… commerce will be quickened,
the ties of sympathy… made more effective, the bonds of sentiment… more enduring’.81
This is not to engage in any crude hagiography of the British Empire and its technol-
ogy in the ‘seeding’ of new nations – though the world was often imagined in such terms
at the time. Nor is to engage in those crude parallels with the World Wide Web that
most perceptive writers, such as the sociologist Manuel Castells, understand must be used
with care, if at all.82 On the contrary: students of world communications have begun to
perceive the true nature of the deeply variegated, uneven and kaleidoscopic nature of the
Victorian ‘net’, and have replaced some of the 19th century’s more centralising rhetoric.
Officials and politicians then thought that they had ‘a universal vision and god’s-eye – or
ear – perspective on the peoples of the world’.83 Lord Salisbury thought that the tele-
graph had ‘assembled all mankind upon one great plane, where they can see everything
that is done… and judge of every policy that is pursued at the very moment those events
take place’.84
Historians of ‘networks’, recently so prolific and so influential, understand why
Salisbury’s intoxication should not be taken at face value; the very nature of a network
must mean that it has empty spaces, gaps and holes. It is in this mould that we might
better understand Bell and Lester’s new works showing how late 19th-century
policymakers and propagandists insisted on the Empire’s importance and potential
strength; they had to lay constant stress on its durability because it was a continuous
building site of international power and influence. Zoe Laidlaw has shown how the
Imperial government’s collection of statistics, maps and personal accounts from the 1830s
onwards should be understood as an attempt to construct ‘order’ and ‘reason’ in a world
in which information was scarce, inconsistent and expensive; Kerry Ward has recently
made a very similar point about the Dutch East India Company in the 18th century.85
Historians influenced by postcolonial literary criticism, such as Ann Stoler and Frederick
Cooper, have demonstrated how ‘imperial knowledge’ was constantly being transferred
and transformed between native peoples, colonisers and other imperial peoples, quite
separately from any communication with the ‘centre’ of Europe’s empires. This process
was hardly ever stable, and it was never reliant on a single source or route.86
In summary, the mid-Victorian cable revolution did indeed reorder the way in which
political space was perceived. It brought some of the distant spaces of the British Empire
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within mere minutes of one another, and aligned them more closely with both the
metropole and with each other. It broke the link between transport and communications.
The cable demonstrated Britain’s imperial reach, her industrial might and her position at
the heart of the worldwide trading network that could assemble the steel, steam, copper
and rubber that these new electric lines required. But steam technology and government
subsidies were in action too, fundamentally altering ship-borne transport and communica-
tions, and bringing most of the world within a few weeks’ travel where once distant lands
had been months away. The telegraph itself made passenger and business shipping faster,
more rational, and more profitable. The flow of paper letters increased just as fast, if not
faster, than the passage of the Telegraph Company’s electric pulses. And so-called
Imperial peripheries were drawn together just as powerfully as they were drawn towards
London, while much of the empire and the rest of the world remained unwired. Taken
together, this is a salutary tale of how technology might not transform the world.
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